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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
David Rex Yeaman, along with four other defendants, 
was convicted of various counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, 
and securities fraud. His conviction resulted from his 
involvement in a complex scheme involving the leasing of 
worthless stocks of three public companies, U.S. Card 
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Investors, Inc. ("U.S. Card"), Omega Power ("Omega"), and 
American Family Services ("AFS"), to the Teale Network 
("Teale"), a fraudulent network of offshore and domestic 
companies.1 Teale represented these leased stocks as assets 
available to pay claims pursuant to reinsurance contracts 
entered into with a Pennsylvania-based insurance 
company, World Life and Health Insurance Co. ("World 
Life"). When these assets were called upon to pay 
outstanding medical reinsurance claims, the stocks were 
deemed worthless. 
 
Yeaman has appealed from the jury's verdict and a 
sentencing adjustment. The government has cross-appealed 
the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
World Life became insolvent at some point in or before 
1988. It hid its insolvency from regulators and its insureds, 
however, by placing a piece of land valued at $60,000 on its 
books as worth several million dollars. World Life issued 
the four group medical policies involved in this case in late 
1989, in the spring of 1990, in the summer of 1990, and on 
December 1, 1990. Teale's contracts reinsuring these 
policies were entered on November 16, 1989, May 30, 1990, 
June 28, 1990, November 10, 1990, and November 11, 
1990. Pursuant to these agreements, Teale assumed 100% 
of the liability under the four group medical insurance 
policies issued by World Life in exchange for 92% of the 
premiums paid by World Life's insureds on those policies. 
These reinsurance transactions allowed World Life to reflect 
a reserve credit of approximately $6 million. Teale received 
total premiums from World Life of approximately $7 million 
under its reinsurance contracts. The indictment alleged 
that the conspiracy among Teale and the defendants 
existed from about May of 1990 to June of 1992. 
 
In 1990, Philip Rennert created Forum Rothmore, which 
acted as an intermediary between Teale and publicly traded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Teale Network was organized and controlled by Alan Teale. Neither 
is a party to these proceedings but both are alleged to be unindicted co- 
conspirators. We will refer to both collectively as "Teale." 
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corporations that desired to lease their stock. Forum 
Rothmore entered into "surplus contribution agreements," 
known as RENN contracts, with Teale. The first RENN 
contract involving one of the defendants was executed on 
September 1, 1990. Yeaman was involved in a series of 
RENN contracts entered between December 1, 1990, and 
April 1, 1991. 
 
Under the terms of these contracts, corporations leased 
their stock to Teale and authorized the sale of the stock if 
necessary to pay claims under insurance policies that Teale 
had reinsured. The value of the stock leased was calculated 
by multiplying the number of shares by the market price. 
Teale then listed these shares at the same value on the 
financial statements presented to World Life. In exchange, 
Teale paid a percentage of the monthly leasing fees it 
received from World Life to Forum Rothmore, which in turn 
split the fees with the stock providers. Of the approximately 
$7 million Teale received, about $3.3 million was 
distributed to the defendants as rental fees for the leased 
securities. 
 
Yeaman was president of Capital General Corporation 
("Capital General"). Capital General assisted other 
companies in going public through mergers with existing 
shell corporations that had previously completed their SEC 
registration. After the merger, Capital General retained 
some interest in the corporations, and Yeaman handled the 
registration and promotion of the stock. National Stock 
Transfer ("NST"), a subsidiary of Capital General, was the 
transfer agent and performed the record keeping functions 
for the public corporations with whom Capital General 
dealt. 
 
U.S. Card, Omega, and AFS were formed via mergers 
orchestrated by Yeaman and Capital General. U.S. Card 
was a small baseball card business operated in the home of 
the father of one of Yeaman's associates in Hull, 
Massachusetts. Its total inventory was less than $50,000. 
Omega was a nearly insolvent business that bought and 
sold surplus high voltage power line equipment. Omega had 
minimal operations conducted by a sole proprietor who was 
desperately seeking capital for his business. AFS also had 
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no significant assets or profit making activity. Yeaman was 
an officer and director of these three corporations. 
 
In spite of the minimal value of these corporations, 
Yeaman purported to lease $8 million of U.S. Card stock, 
$2 million of Omega stock, and $2 million of AFS stock to 
Teale. In order to be able to attribute such high values to 
these stocks, Yeaman manipulated the market quotes and 
inflated the financial statements of these corporations. 
Moreover, while certain of these stocks were restricted, they 
were represented to be marketable and were transferred 
without any indication of their restricted status. Forum 
Rothmore assisted Yeaman in leasing these falsely-valued 
and restricted stocks. In short, securities were falsely held 
out by the defendants and Teale to be marketable and 
valuable, when, in fact, they were not marketable and were 
virtually without value. 
 
In January 1991, the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Department began to investigate World Life's financial 
condition. On July 28, 1991, the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commissioner declared World Life insolvent and ordered its 
liquidation. Since Teale had been paying insurance claims 
with recently received premiums and had no other 
significant assets to draw upon, this liquidation deprived 
Teale of the ability to pay further claims. 
 
The Pennsylvania Life and Health Insurance Guarantee 
Fund is a state fund authorized by statute to pay 
outstanding liabilities of licensed Pennsylvania companies 
that become insolvent. The Guarantee Fund is financed by 
Pennsylvania insurance companies. When World Life was 
liquidated, the Guarantee Fund paid the outstanding group 
medical reinsurance claims left unpaid as a result of the 
fraud. The unpaid claims totaled over $6 million. 
 
In February 1996, Yeaman was indicted in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and charged with one count of 
conspiracy and multiple counts of wire and securities 
fraud. The conspiracy charge included an allegation that 
Yeaman failed to disclose in SEC and NASD filings that he 
"previously had been found to have violated the securities 
laws." (A.116, Count 1 P 6(o)(2)). This allegation was 
incorporated into the wire and securities fraud counts. 
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Yeaman moved to strike this language from the indictment 
on the ground that he had no duty to disclose former 
securities law violations and/or that he did disclose the 
information required by law. 
 
The District Court denied Yeaman's motion because it 
determined that if certain predicate facts could be 
established, Yeaman had a duty to disclose five securities- 
related administrative proceedings. The government later 
introduced two of these proceedings into evidence. One 
proceeding was a 1988 SEC administrative action against 
NST that resulted in a censure order. See In the Matter of 
National Stock Transfer, Inc., 41 S.E.C. Docket 1219 (1988). 
The other proceeding was an SEC investigation that began 
in 1987 and culminated in a cease and desist order entered 
against Yeaman and Capital General in 1993. See In the 
Matter of Capital General Corp., 54 S.E.C. Docket 1322 
(1993). A third proceeding, in which the Oregon 
Department of Insurance and Finance entered a cease and 
desist order against Yeaman and Capital General, was 
admitted by stipulation of the parties. See In the Matter of 
Capital General Corp. and David Yeaman, E7-49 (Oregon 
Dept. of Ins. & Finance, April 28, 1988). 
 
After a four week trial, the jury, by general verdict, 
convicted Yeaman of the one count of conspiracy,five 
counts of wire fraud, and three counts of securities fraud. 
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court assigned 
Yeaman an offense level of 11, which included a one-point 
upward departure for causing a loss of confidence in an 
important institution. The District Court found no 
monetary loss attributable to Yeaman and refused to 
impose adjustments for jeopardizing the safety of a 
financial institution and use of special skills. The District 
Court sentenced Yeaman to 14 months imprisonment and 
a $20,000 fine. 
 
II. 
 
Yeaman first contends that his conviction must be 
reversed because the jury's general verdict may have been 
based on an improper legal theory. Yeaman argues that the 
District Court erred in concluding that he had a duty to 
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disclose the 1988 SEC censure order entered against NST 
and the SEC's investigation that began in 1987 and led to 
a 1993 cease and desist order entered against Capital 
General and Yeaman. The admission at trial of evidence of 
these proceedings allowed the jury to consider Yeaman's 
nondisclosure of them in determining whether he was guilty 
of conspiring, wire fraud, and securities fraud. Yeaman 
seeks reversal and a new trial in which such evidence 
would be excluded. The District Court's legal conclusions 
with respect to these two proceedings are subject to plenary 
review. 
 
A. 1988 SEC Administrative Proceeding against NST 
 
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. S 229.401, mandates that 
certain information pertaining to corporate management 
and control persons be included in the periodic reports that 
public companies file with the SEC. Item 401(f) of that 
regulation requires disclosure of certain legal proceedings 
that occurred in the past five years and that are"material 
to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of any director, 
person nominated to become a director or executive officer 
of the registrant." Item 401(f)'s six subparagraphs list the 
types of legal proceedings that must be disclosed. Items 
401(f)(3) and (4) require disclosure when "[s]uch person was 
the subject of any order, judgment, or decree, not 
subsequently reversed, suspended, or vacated" of a court of 
competent jurisdiction or federal or state authority, and the 
order, judgment, or decree was related to certain specified 
behaviors. 17 C.F.R. S 299.401(f)(3)-(4) (emphasis added). 
 
Since Yeaman was an officer and director of U.S. Card 
and Omega, the government alleged that Item 401(f) of 
Regulation S-K required the 1989 and 1990 Form 10-K 
reports of these companies to disclose the 1988 SEC order 
entered against NST.2 The 1988 order found that NST had 
violated various securities laws on a number of occasions,3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because AFS was a non-registrant and non-reporting company under 
the federal securities laws, Regulation S-K does not apply to it. (A.159 
n.16) 
3. In the course of the administrative proceeding against NST, the 
Commission found that NST willfully violated Sections 17(a)(3), 17(f)(1), 
(2), and (3), 17A(c), 17A(d) and Rules 17f-1, 17f-2, 17Ac2-1, 17Ac2-2, 
17Ad-6, 17Ad-10, 17Ad-11, 17Ad-13 thereunder. (A.235-36) 
 
                                7 
  
censured NST, directed it to take corrective measures, 
ordered it to retain an independent outside accountant to 
report on the implementation of those measures, and 
required NST's president to execute an affidavit verifying 
that the services of an independent accountant had been 
engaged. Yeaman was not a named party to the proceeding. 
 
Before the District Court, Yeaman contended that Items 
401(f)(3) and (4) only refer to persons who were "named" in 
the proceedings and thus that he had no duty to disclose 
the 1988 proceeding against NST. Concluding that this 
argument had no merit, the District Court contrasted the 
text of Items 401(f)(3) and (4) with that of Item 401(f)(2) in 
the same regulation. Item 401(f)(2) requires disclosure if the 
director or control person "was convicted in a criminal 
proceeding or is a named subject of a pending criminal 
proceeding." See 17 C.F.R. S 299.401(f)(2) (emphasis added). 
The District Court observed: "Although Item 401(f)(2) refers 
to `named subject,' Item 401(f)(3) and (4) merely refer to `the 
subject of,' which connotes a broader meaning than`named 
subject.' Surely, if (f)(3) and (f)(4) meant only`named 
subject,' the SEC could have explicitly stated so, as it did 
in (f)(2)." (A.150) 
 
The District Court went on to note that the government 
had alleged that it possessed evidence demonstrating that: 
(1) Yeaman was the director and president of Capital 
General; (2) Yeaman owned more than 90% of Capital 
General's stock; (3) Yeaman owned and controlled NST 
through Capital General; (4) Yeaman was president of NST 
in 1988 and already was or became its director; and (5) 
NST and Capital General were affiliates as defined in Rule 
405 of the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. S 230.405. (A.150-51) 
The Court held that if the government could prove these 
allegations at trial, "then there would be no question that 
Yeaman was the `subject of' [the 1988 order entered 
against NST]." (A.151) 
 
On appeal, Yeaman continues to assert that he was not 
"the subject of" the 1988 proceeding within the meaning of 
17 C.F.R. S 229.401(f)(3) and (4) because he was not a 
named party to that proceeding. In support of this 
argument, he cites to the Uniform and Integrated Reporting 
Requirements: Directors and Executive Officers, Securities 
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Act Release No. 33-5949, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1031, at *24 
(July 28, 1978), which states: 
 
       Item 3 [now known as Item 401, or 17 C.F.R. 
       S 229.401] makes it clear that disclosure of criminal 
       convictions, criminal proceedings, orders, judgments, 
       etc. is required only where the executive officer, 
       director, or nominee for election as a director is a 
       named party in the legal proceeding. 
 
Yeaman avers that the word "criminal" in this SEC release 
does not modify the terms "orders" or "judgments," and that 
the "named party" limitation therefore applies equally to 
civil orders and judgments. He concludes that we should 
defer to this interpretation of S 229.401(f)(3) and (4) by the 
Commission. 
 
In order to understand what Item 3 "makes clear," we 
must examine the above-quoted statement in context. Prior 
to 1978, Regulation S-K contained only Items 1 and 2. In 
1976, the Commission proposed several amendments to 
Regulation S-K, including a new section requiring 
disclosures concerning directors and officers. Section (f) of 
this amendment as originally proposed is substantially 
similar to the current version of Item 401(f), except that 
Section (f)(2) required disclosure if "[s]uch person was 
convicted in a criminal proceeding . . . or is the subject of 
a criminal proceeding which is presently pending." 
Disclosure of Management Background: Uniform Reporting 
Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-12946, 10 
S.E.C. Docket 834, 1976 WL 15989, at *10 (Nov. 2, 1976) 
(emphasis added). In response to comments received on 
this proposed amendment, Item 3(f)(2), as it was known 
upon its adoption in 1978, was amended to read: "[s]uch 
person was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a 
named subject of a pending criminal proceeding." Securities 
Act Release No. 33-5949, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1031, at *40 
(emphasis added). The SEC's statement in the release cited 
by Yeaman is thus explaining a change in the originally 
proposed section dealing solely with criminal proceedings. It 
is accordingly clear that the word "criminal" was intended 
to modify "orders, judgments, etc." as well as "convictions" 
and "proceedings." We find it equally clear that the District 
Court properly regarded the difference between "named 
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subject" in Item 401(f)(2) and "subject" in Item 401(f)(3) and 
(4) as deliberate and significant and properly concluded 
that the latter term is a broader concept. We thus reject 
Yeaman's reading of Item 401(f)(3) and (4). 
 
B. SEC Investigation of Capital General and Ye aman 
between 1987-1990 
 
The anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws impose a 
duty to disclose material facts that are necessary to make 
disclosed statements, whether or not mandatory, not 
misleading. See 15 U.S.C. SS 77q(a), 77x. The District Court 
held that Yeaman violated this duty by failing to disclose, in 
the Form 10-K reports filed by Omega and U.S. Card in 
March 1990, that he and Capital General had been the 
subject of an SEC investigation since 1987.4 
 
The 10-K reports of these companies made no reference 
to this investigation and affirmatively asserted the 
following: 
 
       Other than described above, neither the Registrant nor 
       any of its officers or directors, to their best knowledge, 
       is a party to any material legal proceeding or litigation 
       which would impact the operations or the Registrant, 
       and such persons know of no material legal 
       proceedings, judgments entered, legal actions or 
       litigation contemplated, or threatened which would 
       impair operation of the Registrant in the future. 
 
(A.152 (quoting 10-K reports)). The Court found that 
disclosure of the investigation was necessary in order to 
make not misleading the disavowal of knowledge of 
threatened proceedings that would impair the operations of 
the corporation. As a result of its holding, the Court 
allowed evidence of the investigation to be admitted at trial. 
While the Court's opinion stated that it found the relevant 
statements to be material and misleading, and thus 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In 1993, after a five year investigation, the SEC ordered Yeaman and 
Capital General to cease and desist from committing or causing further 
violations of Sections 5(a) and (c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act, and 
Sections 10(b) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rules 10b- 
5, 12b-20, and 13d-1(c) promulgated thereunder. See In the Matter of 
Capital General Corp., 54 S.E.C. Docket 1322 (1993). 
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violative of the securities laws, the jury instructions 
indicate that the jury was properly charged to make its own 
determinations in these respects. 
 
On appeal, Yeaman insists that he did not know at the 
time of filing the 10-K reports that the SEC planned to 
commence litigation. He notes that the administrative 
proceeding that resulted from this investigation was not 
instituted until June 22, 1992, and did not result in a 
cease and desist order until July 23, 1993. He insists that, 
while he knew of the investigation at the time offiling the 
March 1990 reports, he did not know that the investigation 
was focused on or might impact U.S. Card or Omega. As a 
result, he disagrees that a duty to disclose the investigation 
existed or that the affirmative statements contained in the 
10-K reports were misleading in any respect. In response, 
the government points out, inter alia, that the investigation 
had been ongoing since 1987, that it instituted suit against 
Yeaman and Capital General in June of 1990 to enforce a 
subpoena duces tecum theretofore issued to them, and that 
the Court ordered compliance in July of 1990. Taken as a 
whole, the government argues, the evidence compelled the 
conclusion that Yeaman must have been aware of the scope 
and gravity of the investigation prior to March of 1990 and, 
given his knowledge of his own activities prior to March 
1990, he must have known of the probability of a 
proceeding that would implicate U.S. Card or Omega. 
 
We conclude that the government's evidence regarding 
the investigation was properly submitted to the jury for 
consideration as to whether the 10-K reports were 
materially misleading in light of the affirmative statement 
quoted above. While Yeaman argues that the District Court 
committed a legal error, his claim properly characterized is 
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction 
on the theory that the reports were materially misleading. 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and 
ask whether a "rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(internal citations omitted). Under this standard, we believe 
the government has tendered sufficient evidence to support 
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this theory. We need not base our rejection of Yeaman's 
argument on this ground, however. 
 
We have concluded that 15 U.S.C. SS 77q(a) and 77x 
provide a solid legal foundation for the government's theory 
of liability based on failure to disclose the SEC 
investigation. Assuming that there were insufficient 
evidence to support this theory, Yeaman nevertheless would 
not be entitled to a new trial because the government 
advanced other alternative, legally valid theories at trial 
that were supported by sufficient evidence. Under the 
teachings of Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), we 
are required in such circumstances to presume that the 
jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
on a theory supported by the evidence. 
 
III. 
 
Yeaman also requests reversal based on two challenges to 
the jury instructions. Review of the legal standard 
enunciated in a jury instruction is plenary, see United 
States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1997), but 
review of the wording of the instruction, i.e. , the expression, 
is for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). This Court 
reviews jury instructions to determine whether,"taken as a 
whole, they properly apprized the jury of the issues and the 
applicable law." Dressler v. Busch Entertainment Corp., 143 
F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). 
 
A. Unanimity Instruction 
 
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a), makes 
it unlawful for any person "in the offer or sale of securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation 
or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of 
the mails, directly or indirectly," to do any of the following: 
 
       (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
       or 
 
       (2) to obtain money or property by means of any 
       untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
       state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
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       statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
       under which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
       (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
       business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
       deceit upon the purchaser. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 77q(a). The indictment alleged in the 
conjunctive that Yeaman engaged in conduct that came 
within all three of these subsections. At the conclusion of 
trial, the District Court declined to give the following 
instruction that Yeaman insisted should follow immediately 
after the Court read subsections (1)-(3) of Section 17(a): 
 
        It is not necessary for the government to establish all 
       three types of unlawful conduct in connection with the 
       offer or sale of securities; any one will be sufficient for 
       a conviction if you so find. However, you must 
       unanimously agree upon which of the types of unlawful 
       conduct the defendant engaged in. If you cannot agree 
       on any one or more of the means, you must find the 
       defendant not guilty. 
 
       The District Court instead charged as follows: 
 
        The second element that the government must prove 
       beyond a reasonable doubt is that in the offer or sale 
       of the particular security the defendants did any one or 
       more of the following: 
 
       (1) employed a device, scheme, or artifice to de fraud, 
       or 
 
       (2) made an untrue statement of a material fact or 
       omitted to state a material fact which made what 
       was said, under the circumstances, misleading, or 
 
       (3) engaged in an act, practice, or course of busi ness 
       that operated, or would operate, as a fraud or deceit 
       upon a purchaser, seller, or other person. 
 
       It is not necessary for the government to establish all 
       three types of unlawful conduct in connection with the 
       offer, sale, or purchase of the particular security. Any 
       one type of unlawful conduct will be sufficient for a 
       conviction, if you so find such unlawful conduct. 
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Yeaman suggests that this instruction constitutes reversible 
error.5 
 
It is well settled that a defendant in a federal criminal 
trial has a constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. See 
United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 814 (3d Cir. 1996). 
This includes the right to have the jury instructed that in 
order to convict, it must reach unanimous agreement on 
each element of the offense charged. It is equally well 
settled, however, that this does not mean one has a right to 
insist on an instruction requiring unanimous agreement on 
the means by which each element is satisfied. When a 
statute enumerates alternative routes for its violation, it 
may be less clear, however, whether these are mere means 
of committing a single offense (for which unanimity is not 
required) or whether these are independent elements of the 
crime (for which unanimity is required). In making this 
determination, Edmonds teaches that two questions must 
be addressed: 
 
       First, did the legislature intend the different routes to 
       establish separate "offenses," for which unanimity is 
       required as to every fact constituting the offense, or 
       different "means" of violating a single offense, for which 
       unanimity is not required? Second, if the legislature 
       intended the alternative routes to be mere means of 
       violating a single statute, is the statute's definition of 
       the crime unconstitutional under the Due Process 
       clause? 
 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 815. 
 
We begin our analysis by noting that Section 17(a)first 
focuses on an historic event -- the offer or sale of a security 
utilizing an instrument of interstate commerce. It then 
requires that the defendants' conduct with respect to that 
offer or sale fall within one or more of three closely related 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although the government contends that this issue was waived, we 
note that defense counsel submitted the above-quoted proposed jury 
instruction indicating the need for unanimous agreement as to which 
subsection of Section 17(a) was violated and objected, both at the 
instruction hearing and at the conclusion of trial, to the District 
Court's 
instructions to the extent that they deviated from their proposed 
instructions. 
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categories -- a "device, scheme or artifice to defraud," 
an obtaining of money or property by material 
misrepresentation, or a transaction that operates as a fraud 
or deceit on a purchaser. While each category has its own 
parameters, see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 
(1979), they are largely overlapping categories and all fall 
within the traditional understanding of the concept of 
fraud. Most conduct that falls within one is likely to satisfy 
another as well. 
 
These characteristics of the relevant statute and the 
nature of the specific unanimity charge requested here 
distinguish this case from the situation involved in 
Edmonds and Richardson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1707 
(1999). The statute involved in those cases, the Continuing 
Criminal Enterprise Statute ("CCE"), requires that the 
defendant have engaged in a "continuing series of 
violations" of a broad range of specified criminal statutes. 
The indictments there charged numerous such violations 
and the defendants asked that the jury be instructed that 
it must unanimously agree on each violation it relied upon 
as satisfying the requirement of a "continuing series of 
violations." In both cases, the Courts declined to find that 
Congress intended "CCE predicate offenses to constitute 
mere means of [committing] a single CCE offense" and 
suggested that such a finding would raise serious questions 
under the Due Process Clause. Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 819. 
Both courts stressed that the "statute's word `violations' 
covers many different kinds of behaviors of varying degrees 
of seriousness" and that failing to treat each violation as a 
separate element would create substantial risk that a guilty 
verdict might mask "wide disagreement among the jurors 
about what the defendant did, or did not, do." Richardson, 
119 S. Ct. at 1711. 
 
Section 17(a) does not cover "many different kinds of 
behavior of varying degree of seriousness" and the 
requested charge was not directed at the same concern 
identified in Edmonds and Richardson. The statute is 
limited to fraud in connection with an offer and sale of 
securities in interstate commerce. The requested charge did 
not seek to require jury unanimity with respect to whether 
Yeaman engaged in the alleged market manipulation, the 
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alleged representation of restricted securities as 
unrestricted, or the alleged failure to disclose material SEC 
proceedings. Thus its function would not have been to 
increase the assurance that Yeaman committed specific 
criminal conduct. Its only function would have been to 
require jury unanimity on whether Yeaman's conduct 
constituted a scheme to defraud, an obtaining of money by 
material misrepresentation, or a transaction that operated 
as a fraud on a purchaser, as those concepts are used in 
Section 17(a). 
 
We are confident that the District Court's denial of the 
requested instruction did not in any way frustrate 
Congress's intent in passing Section 17(a) or jeopardize any 
fairness concept embodied in the Due Process Clause. 6 
Indeed, we perceive no purpose that would have been 
served by putting the jurors to the task Yeaman's charge 
would impose on them -- a task that would require them 
not only to determine what Yeaman did but also to agree 
upon the outer limits of each of the subsections of Section 
17(a) in this factual context. 
 
We find the most helpful precedent to be the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976). The statute 
there, 18 U.S.C. S 1001, provided: 
 
       "Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
       department or agency of the United States knowingly 
       and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any 
       trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any 
       false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 
       representations, or make or uses any false writing or 
       document knowing the same to contain any false, 
       fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be 
       fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
       than five years, or both." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In order to comport with due process, we have indicated that different 
means for committing an offense "must reflect notions of `equivalent 
blameworthiness or culpability.' " Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 820 (quoting 
Schad, 501 U.S. at 643). In light of the similarity of these three 
alternatives and the fact that each alternative has the same mental state 
requirement, we conclude that this requirement is met. 
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546 F.2d at 836. Each relevant count of the indictment was 
based on an identified document and charged the 
defendants both with having "made . . . false writings . . . 
knowing the same to contain false . . . statements" and 
with having "falsified, concealed and covered up by trick, 
scheme and device material facts." The Court concluded 
that Section 1001 specified alternative means for 
committing a single offense and that, as a result, it was not 
necessary for "the jury, in arriving at a unanimous verdict, 
[to] agree on the particular means by which the offense was 
committed." The Court explained: 
 
       On the face of it, the statute, framed in a single 
       paragraph and providing a single penalty, does not 
       suggest Congressional purpose to create more than one 
       offense. Moreover, the statute is directed at a single 
       evil, i.e., the "perversion" of "the authorized functions 
       of governmental departments and agencies . . . which 
       might result from the deceptive practices described." 
       United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93, 61 S.Ct. 
       518, 522, 85 L.Ed. 598 (1941). The types of conduct 
       enumerated all fall within the general understanding of 
       what constitutes fraud. As the court put it in Charles 
       Hughes & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 139 
       F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943): 
 
       "The law of fraud knows no difference between 
       express representation on the one hand and implied 
       misrepresentation or concealment on the other." 
 
       See also, Gusow v. United States, 347 F.2d 755, 756 
       (10th Cir. 1965). 
 
       It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Congress 
       was concerned with proscribing the prohibited result 
       rather than particular kinds of conduct. That being so, 
       consistency calls for interpreting the enumeration of 
       different kinds of conduct in the statute as reflecting 
       different modes of achieving that result, not separate 
       and distinct offenses. . . . 
 
546 F.2d at 836. We find this reasoning equally cogent 
here. 
 
B. Restricted Stock Instruction 
 
Yeaman also argues that the District Court improperly 
instructed the jury that it could find a Securities Act 
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violation based solely on his having held and transferred 
restricted stock. According to Yeaman, the charge relieved 
the government of its burden of proving that Yeaman 
engaged in fraud by misrepresenting the restricted stock as 
free-trading stock. 
 
After instructing the jury on the elements of Section 
17(a), the judge noted that "the government contends that 
certain of the defendants engaged in the fraudulent sale of 
restricted stock." (A.4159) The judge informed the jury that 
restricted stock is stock acquired directly or indirectly from 
an issuer in a transaction not involving any public offering; 
and that such stock is deemed "restricted" because there 
are restrictions on its resale to the public. See 17 C.F.R. 
S 230.144. The judge then gave the instruction we have set 
forth in the margin.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Now, the Government contends that the defendants made use of 
certain restricted securities in furtherance of some fraudulent acts and 
practices by distributing and contributing those stocks to the off-shore 
reinsurance companies. I have already defined for you what a restricted 
stock is and the requirements under the law if and when the restricted 
stock is going to be sold. If you find that the defendants held restricted 
stock, then you may find the defendants engaged in acts, practices and 
courses of business that operated as a fraud and deceit. And that they 
made material misrepresentations by manipulating the price of the 
stocks by contributing them to the off-shore reinsurers who placed them 
on their financial statements to give the appearance of highly valued 
assets, by participating in the misrepresentations made by their co- 
conspirators who used those financial statements to misrepresent the 
financial well being of the off-shore reinsurers when contracting with a 
primary insurance company in Pennsylvania. And by misrepresenting 
that these stocks could be liquidated to meet claims when they could 
not. 
 
Now, the Government also contends that the defendants made use of 
certain restricted securities in furtherance of the fraudulent acts and 
practices by distributing and pledging these restricted stocks to the 
banks which held and maintained the escrow accounts. If you find that 
the defendants held restricted stock, then you mayfind that the 
defendants engaged in acts, practices and courses of business that 
operated as a fraud and deceit and made material misrepresentations in 
connection with the deposit of those stocks into the escrow accounts, if 
you find one or more of the following. 
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We do not find this jury instruction to be legally 
inaccurate or improper in any respect. The purpose of the 
Court's instruction was to provide examples of the way that 
the defendants may have violated Section 17(a), assuming 
that the defendants used restricted stock in the course of 
their dealings. To find defendants guilty under one of these 
possible scenarios, the jury first had to find that defendants 
held restricted stock. The implication of the Court's 
statement "[i]f you find that the defendants held restricted 
stock," is that if the jury did not so find, then their 
consideration of this theory was precluded. If the jury did 
find that the defendant held restricted stock, then the jury 
was obliged to consider whether the evidence supported a 
finding that the defendants engaged in transactions with 
these stocks that would operate as a fraud or deceit. Thus, 
we find no error in the Court's restricted stock instruction. 
 
IV. 
 
In combination, the parties raise four sentencing issues. 
The government finds three flaws in the District Court's 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) the finding of 
no loss under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1; (2) the failure to impose a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
First, if you find that the defendants contributed through Forum 
Rothmore and World Re and into the escrow accounts stock positions 
they controlled in one or more of the five companies. And at the time 
they did so, they had not held the Rule 144 stock long enough to meet 
the two or three year holding I described previously. Or secondly, Forum 
Rothmore became an underwriter and was thus engaged in an unlawful 
distribution. An underwriter is defined by statute to mean any person 
who either has purchased from an issuer, with a view to or offers or sells 
for an issuer in connection with the distribution of any security. Or any 
person who participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any 
such undertaking. Or third, they engaged in acts, practices or courses of 
business that operated as a fraud on the escrow accounts when they 
engaged in an unlawful distribution and had violated the rules 
concerning the sale of restricted stock. 
 
It's not necessary you find the defendants engaged in all three of these 
courses of business or conduct. Anyone (sic) is sufficient. 
 
(A-4164-4166). 
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four-level increase under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(6) for a 
substantial effect on a financial institution; and (3) the 
rejection of a special skills enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.3. Yeaman challenges the District Court's upward 
departure based on its finding that Yeaman's fraudulent 
acts resulted in loss of confidence in an important 
institution. 
 
The standard of review of a district court's interpretation 
and application of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. 
See United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 
1994). Findings of facts are measured by the clearly 
erroneous test. See United States v. Hillstrom, 988 F.2d 
448, 450 (3d Cir. 1993). This Court's review of a district 
court's decision to depart upward is plenary as to whether 
the increase was permissible. We review the reasonableness 
of the degree of the departure for an abuse of discretion. 
See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098, 1110 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
 
A. Calculation of Fraud Loss under U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1 
 
Section 2F1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines establishes 
a base offense level of six for offenses involving fraud and 
deceit. See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1.8 Pursuant to Section 2F.1.1(b), 
the base offense level must be increased according to the 
size of the loss. This Court's precedents establish that 
" `fraud loss is, in the first instance, the amount of money 
the victim has actually lost,' " United States v. Coyle, 63 
F.3d 1239, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. 
Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 523, 536 (3d Cir. 1991)). However, "if 
an intended loss that the defendant was attempting to 
inflict can be determined, this figure will be used if it is 
greater than actual loss." Application Note 7 to U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1. While the greater of actual loss and intended loss 
is the preferred measure, there are situations in which the 
defendant's gain can appropriately be used as a 
measurement of loss. A court may look to a defendant's 
gain as an alternative measure but only "[w]hen if it is not 
feasible to estimate with reasonable accuracy the victim's 
loss [or intended loss] and where there is some logical 
relationship between the victim's loss and the defendant's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. All references to the Sentencing Guidelines are to the 1997 version. 
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gain so that the latter can reasonably serve as a surrogate 
for the former." United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 826 
(3d Cir. 1995) (indicating, by way of example, that proceeds 
from resale of object taken could provide estimate of loss 
because sale would establish approximate market value of 
object). Additionally, "the loss need not be determined with 
precision. The Court need only make a reasonable estimate 
of the loss given the available information." Application 
Note 8 to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. 
 
The relevant conduct provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, S 1B1.3, provides that specific offense 
characteristics, -- in this instance the loss amount that 
should be attributed to the defendant under S 2F1.1, -- are 
to be determined on the basis of the following: 
 
       (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
       abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
       willfully caused by the defendant; and 
 
        (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
       activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
       enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with 
       others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all 
       reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 
       furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
 
       that occurred during the commission of the offense of 
       conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the 
       course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility 
       for that offense; 
 
       * * * 
 
       (3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions 
       specified in [the above ] subsections. . . , and all harm 
       that was the object of such acts and omissions. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3. In the context of a jointly undertaken 
criminal activity, Application Note 2 indicates that the 
conduct attributable to a defendant does not include the 
conduct of other participants prior to defendant's joining 
the activity, even if the defendant knows of that conduct. 
See Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3. On the other 
hand, one who commits to a scheme to defraud already in 
progress is responsible from that point on for all reasonably 
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foreseeable loss occasioned by other participants acting in 
furtherance of the scheme. 
 
We have previously held that Section 1B1.3(a)(3) 
establishes a causation requirement when determining 
actual loss. See United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, 
1114-15 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("[T]he plain meaning of`resulted from' 
connotes causation."), opinion amended by 79 F.3d 14 (3d 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 (3d 
Cir. 1998) ("[T]he actual loss determination must be 
predicated on the harm caused by [defendant's] offenses."). 
 
Where the defendant takes something without giving 
anything to the victim in return, the value of the thing 
taken reflects the victim's loss. However, where the 
defendant gave something of value in exchange for what 
was fraudulently taken, the victim's loss is the difference 
between the value of what he or she gave up and the value 
received in exchange. See United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 
818, 825 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
In the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, the Probation 
Office recommended a loss calculation of $6.4 million and 
the addition of 14 levels pursuant to Section 2F1.1(b)(1). 
The $6.4 million amount reflects the unpaid medical 
reinsurance payments owed by Teale to World Life 
pursuant to the terms of the reinsurance contracts and 
ultimately paid by the Guarantee Fund. Nonetheless, in 
sentencing the defendants, the District Court determined 
that the offense involved no loss. The government contends 
that the Court erred in several ways: (1) by determining 
that the offense involved no actual loss; (2) by failing to 
consider the loss that Yeaman and his business associates 
intended to impose; and (3) by failing to account for the fact 
that Yeaman and his co-defendants collectively reaped $3.3 
million as a result of the offense. 
 
In determining that no actual loss occurred, the District 
Court focused on the $6.4 million loss figure contained in 
the sentencing report. The Court concluded: 
 
       The indisputable fact is that [the] overwhelming 
       majority of harm or loss to the victims occurred prior 
       to any of the defendants joining the conspiracy. Indeed 
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       the evidence shows that the loss that the Government 
       is claiming, namely $6.4 million in unpaid claims,[on 
       the insurance policies], was incurred as liabilities by 
       World Life prior to any conduct by the defendants here. 
       In effect, the defendants could not have made the 
       liabilities greater. The stock they contributed merely 
       failed to cover the liabilities incurred . . . . 
 
(A.658-59). The Court did not explicitly make anyfindings 
with respect to intended loss. The District Court also did 
not address the gain acquired by Yeaman and the other 
participants in the scheme. 
 
The District Court found no actual loss because it 
concluded that World Life had issued the policies, and was 
thus committed to pay the $6.4 million in claims, prior to 
the defendant's misrepresentations. We find the District 
Court's analysis flawed for several reasons. 
 
Yeaman and his co-defendants agreed to participate in a 
scheme that would enable Teale to collect millions of dollars 
in premiums from World Life in exchange for virtually 
worthless reinsurance. The victims of the scheme were 
World Life and the beneficiaries of the group medical 
policies. The record demonstrates that the defendants were 
fully aware of the use to be made of their 
misrepresentations in the stock leasing agreements and it 
strongly suggests that these misrepresentations were 
essential to Teale's continued collection of those premiums. 
The reinsurance contracts provided for their termination in 
the event of the reinsurer's insolvency. Without the assets 
of the defendants and the resulting appearance of solvency, 
the most reasonable inference is that World Life would have 
ceased paying premiums to Teale long before it eventually 
did. The District Court failed to make any finding, however, 
as to the likelihood of a causal connection between the 
misrepresentations of the defendants and Teale's collection 
of premiums after the defendants committed themselves to 
support the scheme. 
 
If there was a causal connection between the 
misrepresentations of Teale, Yeaman, and the other 
conspirators and the continued receipt by Teale of 
premiums after Yeaman joined the scheme, Yeaman is 
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responsible for an actual loss equal to the premiums 
received after he joined the scheme less any amount paid 
by Teale in satisfaction of policy claims out of those 
premiums or the sale of the reinsurance assets. Yeaman 
would be responsible in this event for an actual loss 
whether or not World Life issued its group policies or 
entered into its reinsurance contract prior to Yeaman's 
entry on the scene. See United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d at 
825. 
 
Because Teale collected the premiums from World Life as 
a result of jointly undertaken criminal activity, neither we 
nor the District Court on remand need determine whether 
Yeaman in particular caused World Life to cede these 
amounts to Teale. Under Section 1B1.3(a)(1), Yeaman is 
accountable, not only for his own acts, but also for the 
conduct of others that was: (1) in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity; (2) within the scope of the 
criminal activity Yeaman agreed to jointly undertake; and 
(3) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); Application Note 2; 
United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253-54 (3d Cir. 
1998). The record contains ample evidence demonstrating 
that Yeaman understood the extent of Teale's scheme, 
including the roles of other parties to the scheme and the 
need to place a diversity of stocks on Teale's financial 
record in order to pass muster with World Life and 
insurance regulators. Accordingly, we have no difficulty 
concluding that Yeaman is responsible for the acts of all 
others involved in the scheme that occurred after he 
entered the conspiracy, and thus all of the premiums ceded 
by World Life as a result of their combined acts. 
 
The record indicates that Yeaman entered into hisfirst 
RENN contract on December 1, 1990. On remand, if the 
District Court finds a causal connection between the 
conduct of Teale and the other co-conspirators and Teale's 
continued receipt of premiums, it will determine when 
before December 1, 1990, Yeaman committed himself to the 
conspiracy and will calculate the amounts received by Teale 
in premiums under the reinsurance contracts after that 
date. It should then reduce that amount by the total claims 
paid by Teale. If these amounts cannot be calculated with 
precision, reasonable estimates will suffice. 
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The premiums paid by World Life after Yeaman's decision 
to enter the scheme may not, however, be the only actual 
loss measure that this record will support. In United States 
v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104 (3d Cir. 1995), we upheld a district 
court's determination that the actual loss caused by a 
defendant who issued fraudulent insurance policies was the 
amount of unpaid claims of policyholders. The record 
revealed that the defendant misrepresented the amount of 
his initial capital in order to get into the insurance 
business and engaged in fraudulent conduct to perpetuate 
his business. We determined that, but for his fraudulent 
acts, the defendant would not have been able to enter and 
remain in the insurance business. We concluded that the 
insureds' unpaid claims provided a reasonable estimate of 
the harm resulting from the defendant's fraudulent scheme. 
See also United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257, 1270 (5th 
Cir. 1996)(holding that actual loss caused by defendant 
who disguised the insolvency of his insurance company and 
continued to sell policies was losses of policyholders). We 
see no reason why the Neadle analysis should not similarly 
apply where reinsurance is sold based on a fraudulent 
inflation of the value of the reinsurer's assets. 
 
In this case, Teale could not have entered and remained 
in the business of reinsuring World Life but for its 
fraudulent misrepresentations. Although the District Court 
made no finding on the issue, the record would also appear 
to us to support the proposition that World Life was not 
capable of insuring any of the four group medical policies 
without having received a commitment for 100% 
reinsurance. It follows that if the Teale fraudulent 
reinsurance contracts had not been available, World Life 
would either have secured other reinsurance or would not 
have issued the group policies involved. If reinsurance from 
a solvent reinsurer had been obtained, all claims under the 
policies would have been paid to the reinsurer; if the group 
policies had not been issued, the employers who purchased 
the policies from World Life would have obtained group 
medical coverage from another source and all claims of the 
beneficiaries would have been paid in full. In either event, 
under the teachings of Neadle, there would have been a 
causal nexus between the fraud and all unpaid claims. 
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While it is true, as Yeaman stresses, that he cannot be 
held responsible for the consequences of Teale's 
misrepresentations before he joined the conspiracy, he 
would be responsible for all loss under a group policy 
reinsured by Teale after he committed to the scheme. The 
timing of Yeaman's own misrepresentation would be 
immaterial. While Yeaman's initial RENN contract was 
entered into on December 1, 1991, a few weeks after the 
last of the reinsurance contracts, the record suggests that 
his decision to join the fraudulent scheme may have 
predated at least some of those reinsurance contracts. 
 
By identifying these ways in which the record suggests 
that Yeaman may be responsible for an actual loss suffered 
by World Life and the beneficiaries of its group medical 
policies, we do not foreclose the District Court from 
concluding, after an analysis consistent with this opinion, 
that the government has failed to carry its burden of 
proving a causal nexus by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Neither do we intend to indicate that a careful analysis of 
the voluminous record here could not find support for other 
theories involving such a nexus. Even if Yeaman joined the 
scheme after all of the reinsurance contracts had been 
entered, for example, it does not necessarily follow that he 
is not responsible for any of the unpaid claims arising 
under the group policies. Neadle emphasizes that an 
insurer's continued fraud may allow it to remain in 
business longer than it otherwise would. Here, in the 
absence of Yeaman's participation in the scheme, Teale's 
insolvency may have surfaced earlier than it did and less 
loss may have been occasioned to World Life and the 
beneficiaries of its group policies than was in fact 
occasioned by the end of the conspiracy. We do not mean 
to foreclose the District Court on remand from pursuing 
this or any other theory of actual loss suggested by the 
record. We hold only that the District Court's limited 
factual findings do not support its conclusion that no 
actual loss was occasioned. 
 
The government also contends that the intended loss in 
this case exceeds the actual loss and should, therefore, be 
used in applying U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. It argues that the 
intended loss is the face value of the stock provided by 
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Yeaman and others under the RENN contracts and reported 
in Teale's financial statements. We do not agree that 
Yeaman and his co-conspirators intended to cause a loss 
equal to the amount of the represented value of the leased 
stocks. Intended loss refers to the defendant's subjective 
expectation, not to the risk of loss to which he may have 
exposed his victims. United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 
529-531 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, Yeaman and the others 
undoubtedly hoped that their fraudulently inflated 
securities would never have to be sold and that the scheme 
would continue for the indefinite future. The loss that they 
intended was the premiums Teale would receive less any 
payment of claims necessary to keep the scheme alive. We 
express no view at this juncture as to whether the current 
record will support a finding of an intended loss in excess 
of the actual loss. 
 
Additionally, while we do not foreclose the District Court 
from considering the gain of Yeaman and the others on 
remand, their gain would not appear to us to be a helpful 
alternative in this factual context. That gain would appear 
to be limited to an amount equal to the minimum actual 
loss we have held to be appropriate, i.e., to the premiums 
received by Teale after Yeaman's joinder, less any claims 
paid in order to maintain the scheme, including any 
amounts paid by Teale in satisfaction of the outstanding 
claims upon liquidation. 
 
B. Failure to Apply Four Level Increase Under Section 
2F1.1(b)(6) 
 
Section 2F1.1(b)(6) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines provides: 
 
       If the offense-- 
 
       (A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness 
       of a financial institution; or 
 
       (B) affected a financial institution and the defendant 
       derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from 
       the offense, 
 
       increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense level is less 
       than level 24, increase to level 24. 
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U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(6). Application Note 15 states: 
 
       An offense shall be deemed to have "substantially 
       jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial 
       institution" if, as a consequence of the offense, the 
       institution became insolvent; substantially reduced 
       benefits to pensioners or insureds; was unable on 
       demand to refund fully any deposit, payment, or 
       investment; was so depleted of its assets as to be 
       forced to merge with another institution in order to 
       continue active operations; or was placed in 
       substantial jeopardy of any of the above. 
 
In the course of rejecting an enhancement under Section 
2F1.1(b)(6), the District Court explained: 
 
       Based on the evidence the Court finds that the 
       defendants did not substantially jeopardize the safety 
       or soundness of World Life. As with respect to the loss 
       calculation, the Government must demonstrate a 
       causal connection between the defendants' conduct 
       and the safety and soundness of the institution. 
 
       In this case the conduct of the defendants could not 
       have caused World Life to become insolvent. World Life 
       had been insolvent as a matter of pure accounting long 
       before any of the defendants charged conduct. Clearly 
       the conduct of the defendants could not have caused 
       World Life to become insolvent because it already was. 
 
       Finally, the evidence does not establish that 
       defendants' conduct caused any of the other 
       consequences in application note 15. 
 
(A. 659-60). 
 
While the government concedes that the reinsurers did 
not cause World Life's insolvency, they nonetheless contend 
that the Court erred in refusing to order an enhancement 
under Section 2F1.1(b)(6)(A).9 The government maintains 
that the conduct of Yeaman and the other parties to the 
scheme substantially reduced benefits to insureds and "left 
the company `unable on demand to refund fully any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The government has not raised the issue of whether an enhancement 
was appropriate under Section 2F1.1(b)(6)(B). 
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deposit, payment, or investment' or meet its obligations to 
insureds." Government Br. at 117. 
 
Consistent with our previous conclusion that the District 
Court's factual findings do not support its holding of no 
actual loss, we conclude that the District Court also erred 
in holding that Yeaman did not substantially jeopardize the 
safety and soundness of World Life by (1) substantially 
reducing benefits to World Life's insureds and (2) placing 
World Life in a position such that it was unable to refund 
premiums that were paid in exchange for non-existent 
coverage. Yeaman and the others received several million 
dollars of premiums from World Life that should have gone 
towards paying insureds' claims or refunding their 
premiums. See United States v. McDermott, 102 F.3d 1379 
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, even though victim 
corporation was insolvent independent of fraud,finding of 
actual loss of $5-10 million caused by defendants' fraud 
was irreconcilable with finding that defendants did not 
substantially reduce benefits to insureds or cause 
corporation to be unable to refund deposit, payments, or 
investments). 
 
Accordingly, we will remand for application of Section 
2F1.1(b)(6)(A). 
 
C. Upward Departure for Loss of Confidence i n Important 
Institution 
 
Yeaman appeals the District Court's decision to impose a 
one-level upward departure based on the loss of confidence 
in an important institution that resulted from his 
fraudulent acts. Yeaman's challenge is two-fold. He argues 
that the Court abused its discretion by both (1) concluding 
that this case fell outside the "heartland" of typical fraud 
cases; and (2) determining that the record supported the 
imposed departure. 
 
We begin our analysis by noting that the Commission 
conceives of each offense guideline as "carving out a 
`heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct 
that each guideline describes." U.S.S.G., Ch. 1, Pt. A intro. 
p.s. 4(b). In the unusual case where a defendant's conduct 
falls outside the typical "heartland," the court may consider 
a departure from the guidelines range. Id. A district court 
 
                                29 
  
may impose a sentence outside the guideline range where 
"the court finds that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
result in a sentence different from that described." 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(b); see U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0. 
 
As this Court explained in United States v. Iannone, 184 
F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1999): 
 
       The Supreme Court provided additional guidance on 
       departures in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95 
       (1996), instructing courts to apply the following 
       analysis when considering a S 5K2.0 departure. First, 
       identify the factor or factors that potentially take the 
       case outside the Guidelines' "heartland" and make it 
       special or unusual. Id. at 95. Second, determine 
       whether the Guidelines forbid departures based on the 
       factor, encourage departures based on the factor, or do 
       not mention the factor at all. Id. at 94-95. Third, apply 
       the appropriate rule: (1) if the factor is forbidden, the 
       court cannot use it as a basis for departure; (2) if the 
       factor is encouraged, the court is authorized to depart 
       if the applicable guideline does not already take it into 
       account; (3) if the factor is discouraged, or encouraged 
       but already taken into account by the applicable 
       guideline, the court should depart only if the factor is 
       present to an exceptional degree, or in some other way 
       makes the case different from the ordinary case in 
       which the factor is present; or (4) if the factor is 
       unmentioned, "the court must, after considering the 
       structure and theory of both relevant individual 
       guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole, decide 
       whether [the factor] is sufficient to take the case out of 
       the Guideline's heartland." Id. at 95-96 (internal 
       citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the instant case, the District Court concluded that a 
resulting loss of confidence in an important institution took 
this case out of the "heartland" of fraud cases. The 
Commission has explicitly encouraged departures based on 
this factor. Application Note 10 to U.S.S.G. S 2F.1.1 
provides a nonexclusive list of circumstances in which the 
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loss calculated pursuant to Section 2F1.1 "does not fully 
capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct." 
Application Note 10 to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 (1997). Causing a 
loss of confidence in an important institution is identified 
as one such circumstance. See Application Note 10(e). 
 
Because the Guidelines suggest that a finding of loss of 
confidence in an important institution is sufficient by itself 
to place a case outside the "heartland" of typical fraud 
cases, we limit our examination to whether the Court 
properly considered the evidence put forth by the 
government and whether this evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding of loss of confidence in an important 
institution.10 
 
At sentencing, the government argued that the 
defendants' scheme had caused a loss of confidence in both 
the insurance industry and the stock market. In support of 
its arguments, the government submitted a series of letters 
from policyholders of World Life and a letter from William 
McLucas, the Director of Enforcement at the SEC. Although 
it granted the departure, the Court did not state whether it 
based the departure on a finding of loss of confidence in the 
insurance industry, the stock market, or both. 
 
Yeaman relies on this Court's holding in United States v. 
Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104 (3d Cir. 1996) to support his 
argument that the District Court departure has inadequate 
record support. In Neadle, the defendant, as we have noted, 
had been convicted of mail fraud in connection with the 
formation and maintenance of an insurance company. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In Yeaman's reply brief, he asserted for thefirst time that Section 
2F.1.1(b)(6) of the Guidelines already takes loss of confidence into 
account, at least when the important institution at issue is a financial 
institution. As a result, Yeaman contends that the Court cannot grant an 
upward departure based on Application Note 10(e) unless the instant 
offense involved exceptional aggravating circumstances. While Yeaman 
has waived this argument by failing to raise it sooner, we nonetheless 
note that it has no merit in this particular case where the financial 
institution at issue for purposes of Section 2F1.1(b)(6), World Life, is 
an 
institution separate and distinct from the "important institution" 
supporting the Court's decision to upwardly depart pursuant to Section 
5K2.0. See discussion infra. 
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district court imposed a one point upward departure on the 
ground that " `[t]he offense itself contributed materially to 
the destruction of the reputation of the insurance industry 
in the territory." Id. at 1112 (quoting district court). This 
Court held that this upward departure was improper. We 
explained: "[T]he court based the upward departure not on 
sworn testimony but on unsupported judicial conclusion. 
Such judicial speculation cannot provide the basis for an 
upward departure." Id. We emphasized that the 
government, when asked for its evidence supporting the 
argument for a departure, had merely cited conversations 
with fifteen insureds of the fraudulent company"who did 
not hold the insurance industry in very high regard, 
meetings with people on the street, and evidence from 
reading newspapers." Id. at 1112 n.8 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 
Relying on the language in Neadle, Yeaman contends that 
the upward departure for loss of confidence in an 
institution in this case was similarly based on unsupported 
judicial conclusions rather than competent evidence. First, 
he notes that none of the materials submitted by the 
government in support of the upward departure consisted 
of sworn testimony. Second, he argues that the letters from 
policy holders tendered by the government demonstrate 
nothing more than their frustration occasioned by World 
Life's failure, i.e. their lack of coverage and resulting out-of- 
pocket expenses or inability to receive health care services. 
Finally, he observes that the SEC letter speaks generally 
about the deleterious effects of fraud on the securities 
market, but does not claim that Yeaman's conduct actually 
contributed to a loss of public confidence in the market. 
 
We do not understand Neadle to hold that unsworn, but 
reliable and probative evidence cannot be relied upon by a 
sentencing court to support a departure. The law is clearly 
to the contrary. Rather "[i]n resolving any dispute 
concerning a factor important to the sentencing 
determination, the court may consider relevant information 
without regard to its admissibility under the rules of 
evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information 
has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable 
accuracy." U.S.S.G. S 6A1.3; United States v. Brothers, 75 
F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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With respect to the letters from World Life's insured, we 
find ourselves in agreement with Yeaman. As he points out, 
these letters demonstrate the policyholders' frustration in 
the past with World Life, their inability to receive benefits 
from World Life after having paid their premiums, and the 
resulting financial strain as medical problems arose. None 
of these letters suggest that World Life's insureds will be 
unlikely to purchase medical insurance in the future. 
 
Nonetheless, the government's evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding of loss of confidence in the stock market. 
The McLucas letter provides an expert opinion that 
manipulation of the market through means like those 
employed by Yeaman destroy confidence in the securities 
market and that a fraudulent scheme with respect to a few 
stocks can have a pervasive, detrimental effect. As Director 
McLucas explained: 
 
       [W]hen the integrity of the secondary market is 
       undermined by a manipulation scheme involving even 
       only a few stocks, there inevitably is a more persuasive 
       effect on the securities markets as a whole. When 
       investors lose confidence in the securities markets as a 
       result of market manipulation of a particular stock 
       market integrity as a whole is diminished. When that 
       happens, investment in securities of other issurers is 
       impeded. 
 
(A. 495). 
 
We find that the McLucas letter along with the other 
evidence concerning Yeaman's conduct provides a 
satisfactory predicate for the District Court's upward 
departure. It is not necessary in a situation of this kind 
that the government produce someone whose confidence in 
the institution has diminished as a result of the defendants' 
conduct. We think it clear that a sentencing court may infer 
that the requisite loss of confidence has occurred based on 
the evidence concerning the character of the fraud, and 
expert opinion testimony like that of Director McLucas 
regarding the impact of that kind of fraud on the particular 
institution involved. Moreover, where the Court can draw 
the inference that some loss of confidence in the institution 
occurred, that will suffice; it is not necessary that the loss 
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from this particular scheme be further quantified. See 
United States v. Rowe, 999 F.2d 14 (lst Cir. 
1993)(permitting inference of loss of confidence in the 
health insurance industry based solely on the character of 
the defendant's fraudulent scheme). 
 
On remand, the District Court should reevaluate its 
decision to impose a one level upward departure in light of 
our observations concerning the letters of World Life's 
insured. If it infers that some loss of confidence in the stock 
market has occurred, it may reimpose its original 
departure. 
 
D. Failure to Apply Two Level Enhancement Unde r Section 
3B1.3 
 
Section 3B1.3 provides: 
 
       If the defendant abused a position of public or private 
       trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that 
       significantly facilitated the commission or concealment 
       of the offense, increase by 2 levels. This adjustment 
       may not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is 
       included in the base offense level or specific offense 
       characteristic. 
 
Application Note 2 states: 
 
       "Special skill" refers to a skill not possessed by 
       members of the general public and usually requiring 
       substantial education, training or licensing. Examples 
       would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, 
       chemists, and demolition experts. 
 
The government contends that the District Court erred in 
refusing to impose an enhancement on Yeaman based on 
his specialized knowledge of the stock market as a prior 
stock broker and his particular knowledge acquired over 
decades of experience in the over-the-counter (bulletin 
board) market, the inner workings of a brokeragefirm, and 
use of a transfer agent. While the Guideline itself precludes 
the adjustment if the abuse of skill is included in the base 
offense level or specific offense characteristic, the District 
Court declined to impose the enhancement because "the 
basis for the proposed enhancement, constitutes part of the 
elements of the offense for which he has been convicted." 
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(A.710 (emphasis added)). The District Court, believed that 
an enhancement for use of special skills would amount to 
"double counting." 
 
We hold that the District Court misconstrued the 
applicable law when it looked to whether the special skill 
used was part of the statutory offense, rather than included 
in the Guideline applicable to that offense.11 The relevant 
Guideline here, which applies to all fraud cases, neither 
makes reference to a special skill or directs that Section 
3B1.3 not be applied. It follows that Section 3B1.3 must be 
applied if its factual predicates are satisfied. Accordingly, 
we will remand for initial findings as to whether Yeaman 
possessed special skills within the meaning of Section 
3B1.1 and, if so, whether he used these skills to 
significantly facilitate the commission of the offense.12 While 
Application Note 2 does not specifically recognize stock 
brokers as persons possessing special skills in its list of 
examples, enhancements based on a defendant's special 
skills he or she developed as a broker or financier and used 
in the commission of securities fraud are proper in some 
circumstances. Cf. United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191 
(1st Cir. 1992) (holding that stockbroker's ability to launder 
large amount of stock while shielding the true owner's 
identity in a way that a lay person could not do without 
attracting scrutiny supported use of special skill 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Yeaman notes that the government agreed, at the sentencing hearing, 
that the issue "was whether or not the special skill used his is so part 
and parcel of the overall offense as to constitute an element." (A.716) 
Nonetheless, we do not find that the government has waived the right to 
assert the correct state of the law. The government's argument appears 
to be due to mere inadvertence rather than a calculated attempt to 
mislead the District Court. In fact, the government stated the law 
correctly in its sentencing memorandum. See In re Chambers 
Development Co., 148 F.3d 214, 229 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Asserting 
inconsistent positions does not trigger the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
unless intentional self-contradiction is used as a means of obtaining 
unfair advantage."). 
 
12. The government contends that the District Court made this required 
factual finding. The government cites the Court's statement that "this 
program . . . was not devised by Mr. Miller, but by those who were expert 
in the field of manipulating the stock." (A. 718-19) We do not find this 
statement to be sufficiently explicit on this point. 
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enhancement of sentence for violation of federal currency 
reporting requirements). 
 
V. 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we will affirm Yeaman's 
conviction on all counts and the District Court's imposition 
of a one-point upward departure based on loss of 
confidence in an important institution. We will remand for 
application of U.S.S.G. SS 2F1.1, 2F1.1(b)(6), and 3B1.3. 
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